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PROBLEMS IN PARADISE: CONSCIOUS 
MALADMINISTRATION IN THE ATO
ROBIN WOELLNER*
I BACKGROUND
Du Pont and Lubesky1 observed in 2013 in relation to the Canada Revenue Authority that:
Even though the majority of tax officials are conscientious and play a vital role in the 
administration of the tax system, abusive audits can and do occur for a variety of reasons. Some 
cases have involved personally motivated malevolence toward a taxpayer,2 some … [involved] 
administrative blunders within the tax department (such as lost records or inaccurate record 
keeping),3 while others simply result from inadequate training or supervision of the auditor.
So it is with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) — and most large bureaucracies. The 
ATO has a proud record of service to the Australian community. Nevertheless, over the years, a 
number of taxpayers have felt that they have been unfairly treated by the ATO, and have taken 
action to attack the ATO’s alleged lack of bona fides (good faith) in making assessments, or 
otherwise dealing with taxpayer’s affairs.4 As noted above and discussed later in this article, 
similar concerns have been raised in other jurisdictions.
Despite some extreme situations, until 2015 taxpayers had invariably failed in such actions. 
For example, in Marijancevic v DCF of T,5 the court found that the ATO had acted ‘too hastily 
in issuing a garnishee notice, too carelessly in addressing the garnishee notice letter, and too 
slowly subsequently in issuing default assessments’. Nevertheless, the court held that the 
taxpayer had failed to establish that the ATO had acted in bad faith.6
 * Adjunct Professor, University of New South Wales and James Cook University. 
 1 G Du Pont and M H Lubetsky, ‘The Power To Audit Is the Power To Destroy: Judicial Supervision of the Exercise 
of Audit Powers’, Canadian Tax Journal (2013) 61 (Supp), 103.
 2 Citing Main Rehabilitation Co, v Canada, 2004 FCA 403 and Chhabra v The Queen 89 DTC 5310 (FCTD).
 3 Citing Leroux v Canada Revenue Authority 2012 BCCA 63 (CRA auditors shredded taxpayer’s original documents, 
then disallowed deductions on the basis that the taxpayer did not have adequate supporting documentation); Gallant 
v The Queen 2012 TCC 119 (CRA’s form contained errors which led a taxpayer to claim an excessive deduction); 
and Agence du revenue du Quebec v Groupe Enrico Inc 2011 QCCA 1924 (inflated assessment resulting from 
significant CRA calculation errors followed by two aborted garnishee actions).
 4 The broader potential problem of increased non-compliance which can result from taxpayer perceptions of 
unfairness or procedural injustice in ATO actions have been highlighted in studies for many years, including K 
Murphy, ‘Procedural justice and tax compliance’ Working Paper 56 (Feb 2004) Centre for Tax System Integrity, 
ANU; M Wenzel, ‘Motivation or rationalisation? Causal relationships between ethics, norms and tax compliance’, 
Working Paper 63 (May 2005) Centre for Tax System Integrity, ANU; Simon James, Kristina Murphy and Monika 
Reinhart, ‘Taxpayer Beliefs and Views: Two New Surveys’ (2005) Australian Tax Forum 157; and, more recently, 
Julie M Barkworth and Kristina Murphy, ‘Procedural justice, policing and citizen compliance behaviour: The 
importance of emotion’ (2015) 21(3) Psychology, Crime and Law 254. 
 5 [2008] ATC ¶20-046, 8267 (Ryan, Kenny and Stone JJ).
 6 The formulation of the claim common in Australia prior to the 2008 decision in Futuris Corporation Ltd v FC of 
T [2008] ATC ¶20-039 was in terms of lack of good faith.
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The tort of conscious (or ‘deliberate’)7 maladministration (previously known as ‘misfeasance 
in public office’) was developed by courts many years ago to deal with abuses of public office,8
though it has gone in and out of favour over time. The tort has been extremely difficult to prove, 
largely because of the requirement to prove knowledge or malice by the decision-maker,9 and 
there was until recently an impressive line of cases in which taxpayers had failed to successfully 
establish their claim. Indeed, in Hii v Commissioner of Taxation10 Collier J observed that there 
did not seem to have been a reported case prior to Donoghue v Commissioner of T (‘Donoghue’)11
in 2015, where a taxpayer was able to successfully establish conscious maladministration by 
the ATO or its officers.12
No doubt this general lack of success also reflects in part the courts’ view that an allegation 
of bad faith in assessing a taxpayer is ‘a serious allegation and one not lightly to be made. It 
is, thus, not particularly surprising that allegations directed at setting aside assessments on the 
basis of [ATO] absence of good faith have generally been unsuccessful… one would hope that 
this was and would continue to be the case’.13 Indeed, as Haggstrom observes, ‘The courts 
have traditionally operated on the assumption that ATO staff will act honestly in their work and 
hence the hurdle for proving that the ATO has acted improperly is generally fairly high’.14
While this is true, a delicate balancing act is involved. In policy terms, imposing too heavy a 
liability on public officers ‘may deter officials from exercising powers conferred on them when 
their exercise would be for the public good’. On the other hand, defining liability too narrowly 
may mean that persons affected by an abuse of public power are left without a remedy. The 
courts applying the tort of conscious maladministration must try to balance these competing 
considerations.15
While the tort of conscious maladministration by a public officer was ‘well-established’16
in general law, the tort had lain fallow in Australian tax jurisprudence until it was brought to 
the attention of the tax profession by the 2008 High Court decision in Futuris, where it was 
identified as one of the two possible foundations for an attack under s 39B of the Judiciary 
Act 1903 (Cth) on the validity (rather than the accuracy) of a tax assessment.17 Since then, a 
number of taxpayers have brought actions alleging ‘conscious maladministration’ by the ATO,18
although it was 2015 before a taxpayer succeeded in such a claim. 
 7 FCT v Futuris Corporation Ltd 2008 ATC ¶20-039 [66] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). The tort 
involves a deliberate failure to comply with e.g. the provisions of an Act (ie knowingly or with deliberate disregard 
acting in excess of their powers [55]).
 8 In NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65 [10], Brennan J stated that ‘it is the absence of an honest attempt to perform the 
functions of the office that constitutes the abuse of office’; see also N Cox, ‘Justice, fairness and the common 
law: The tort of misfeasance in public office’ (May 26, 2015) <http://ssrn.com/abstract-2610837>; J Bevacqua, 
Taxpayer Rights to Compensation for Tax Office Mistakes CCH & ATTA Doctoral Series No 3.
 9 See Bevacqua, above n 8, 44, 49 and A Freeman and B May, ‘Taking on the government: what is misfeasance 
in public office?’ <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=98d56500-b3d6-49a-a463-5414580372ad>. 
Bevacqua notes, at 43, that traditionally, liability for conscious maladministration is personal to the offending 
public officer, and the Crown is not vicariously liable — though apparently the Commissioner agreed in Re Young 
v Commr of Taxation [2008] AATA 155 to indemnify the employee involved.
10 [2015] FCA 375 [98].
11 [2015] FCA 235.
12 Hii v Commr of Taxation [2015] FCA 375; [2015] ATC ¶20-501, [98] (Collier J). 
13 Kordan Pty Ltd v FC of T [2000] ATC 4812 [60] (Hill, Dowsett and Hely JJ); quoted with approval in the joint 
judgment in Futuris, above n 7 [60].
14 Peter Haggstrom, ‘A Critical Review of Tax Administration in Australia From An Ombudsman’s Office Perspective’ 
in Abe Greenbaum and Chris Evans (eds), Tax Administration — Facing the Challenge of the Future (1998) 263, 
267; see also Bevacqua, above n 8, 48–9. However, this ‘trust’ of ATO officers is ‘not unqualified’: Donoghue, 
above [142] (Collier J) — quoting the joint judgment in Futuris, above n 7 at [23]–[25], [55]–[57].
15 Sanders v Snell [1998] HCA 64 [37] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ).
16 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65, joint judgment [65], Brennan J [4]; Sanders v Snell, above [42] (Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, Kirby and Hayne JJ) — though they noted that the tort was of ‘imprecise scope’. In Mengel, Mason CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ stated at [57] that it ‘was recognised as recently as 1973 that the precise 
limits of the tort … were then undefined … In important respects, that it still true’.
17 FCT v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] ATC ¶20-039.
18 See A Freeman and B May ‘Taking on the Government: what is misfeasance in public office?’ Lexology, 26 
January 2015. In Hii v C of T [2015] FCA 375 [83], [84], [97], Collier J cited Gashi v C of T [2013] FCAFC 30 
[43] (Bennett, Edmonds and Gordon JJ) and C of T v AAT [2011] FCAFC 37, which equated the concepts of bad 
faith and conscious maladministration.
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II THE ELEMENTS OF ‘CONSCIOUS MALADMINISTRATION’
The cause of action in conscious maladministration had been considered by the High Court in 
non-tax contexts in Northern Territory v Mengel,19 and subsequently in Sanders v Snell.20
In Mengel, the plaintiff failed to establish that unauthorised actions taken by Northern 
Territory cattle inspectors which prevented a station owner from selling their cattle at a 
particular time constituted conscious maladministration, even though the inspectors were aware 
of the problems their decision would cause for the complainant. In the course of his judgment, 
Deane J set out21 clearly the elements which the taxpayer was required to prove in order to 
establish conscious maladministration as being:
1. an invalid or unauthorised act22
2. done maliciously23
3. by a public officer24
4. in the purported discharge of his or her public duties
5. which causes loss or harm to the plaintiff.
The critical element is ‘malice’25 — which, not surprisingly, has generally been the most 
difficult element to establish. 
In relation to ‘malice’, the Full Federal Court in Denlay v FCT stressed that the ‘bad faith’ in 
conscious maladministration refers to actual bad faith, and ‘does not include constructive bad 
faith established by unwitting involvement in [an] offence’. The focus is on the state of mind of 
the officers making the assessment; and the concept relates to the integrity of the process and 
the competence and honesty of the officers involved in making the assessment.26
In Mengel, Deane J stated that for the purposes of conscious maladministration, ‘malice’ 
would exist if the act was done (i) with actual intent to cause such injury; (ii) with knowledge 
of invalidity or lack of power and with knowledge that it would be likely to cause such injury; 
or (iii) with reckless indifference27 or deliberate blindness to that invalidity or lack of power 
and that likely injury.28
19 [1995] HCA 65 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gordon, McHugh JJ).
20 Sanders v Snell [1998] HCA 64.
21 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65 [23].
22 Mengel, Deane J at [8].
23 Or knowingly — Mengel, Brennan J at [9], [10]: that is, the tort is triggered by states of mind that are inconsistent 
with an honest attempt by a public officer to properly perform the functions of public office. His Honour observed 
at [9] that in ‘more recent times, the scope of the tort has not been limited to cases in which a public officer has 
acted maliciously … but [extends to situations where] a public officer engages in conduct in purported exercise of 
a power but with actual knowledge that there is no power to engage in that conduct’.
24 Bevacqua, above n 8, 44, notes that there is ‘no single clear test’ to identify a public officer, and that it has been 
suggested that employees occupying position lower on the public service ladder might not be held to be occupying 
a public office — thus creating difficulties for plaintiffs. In Mengel, above n 21, Brennan J stated at [5] that a 
‘public officer’ is anyone who is appointed to discharge a public duty, and receives a compensation in whatever 
shape, whether from the Crown or otherwise’. In Donoghue (below) Collier J avoided this problem by identifying 
the Commissioner of Taxation as the ‘public officer’ by virtue of their statutory duty to issue the assessments in 
question — raising the possibility of the Commissioner being personally liable for damages — see the discussion 
below.
25 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65, Deane J [23].
26 [2011] FCAFC 63 [76]–[80] — cited in Roberts v DCT [2013] FCA 1108 [25 (Besanko J — first instance).
27 ‘Recklessness’ is usually defined via an objective test as conduct beyond mere inadvertence or carelessness, 
involving disregard or indifference to consequences that are reasonably foreseeable as being a likely result of 
actions taken — running what a reasonable person would regard as ‘an unjustifiable risk’ or ‘a conscious disregard 
of an unjustified risk’ amounting to ‘gross carelessness’: BRK (Bris) Pty Ltd v FC of T [2001] ATC 4111 [77]–[80] 
(Cooper J); Yazbek v FC of T [2014] ATC ¶10-369 [93]–[103] ( Bennett J) and other cases cited in Woellner et al, 
Australian Taxation Law, (25th edn) 2015, 1,870–1 nn 23–5. ‘Recklessness’ therefore involves an intermediate 
state between lack of reasonable care (mere carelessness) and intentional conduct: see Woellner (above) at 1,863–4 
and 1,871–2 respectively.
28 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65, Deane J [24].
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Brennan J took a similar view, observing that:
Misfeasance in public office consists of a purported exercise of some power or authority by 
public officer otherwise than in an honest attempt to perform the functions of his or her office 
whereby loss is caused to a plaintiff. Malice, knowledge and reckless indifference are states 
of mind that stamp on a purported but invalid exercise of power the character of abuse of all 
misfeasance in public office. If the impugned conduct and causes injury, the cause of action 
is complete.29
The judges delivering the joint judgment in Mengel30 were less definite. After earlier stating 
that principle suggested that misfeasance in public office was a counterpart to torts involving 
intentional infliction of harm and should be confined in the same way,31 their Honours stated 
merely that if misfeasance in public office was to be viewed as a counterpart to the torts imposing 
liability on private individuals for the intentional infliction of harm, there was ‘much to be said 
for the view that’ misfeasance would include reckless disregard of the means of ascertaining 
the extent of the officer’s power.32
In Sanders v Snell, Sanders failed to prove conscious maladministration in relation to his 
dismissal from his position as Executive Officer of the Norfolk Island Government Tourist 
Bureau. The High Court quoted from the judgment in Mengel (above) and noted that
For the purposes of deciding Mengel, the majority considered it sufficient to proceed on the 
basis that the tort requires an act which the public official knows is beyond power and which 
involves a foreseeable risk of harm, but noted also that there seems much to be said for the 
view that misfeasance extends to the situation of a public official recklessly disregarding the 
means of ascertaining the extent of his or her power.33
Accordingly, while Mengel is usually cited for the proposition that reckless indifference is 
sufficient to found the tort,34 this may not reflect the actual decision in that case. It will be 
interesting to see how the current High Court approaches the issue, should it have another 
opportunity to consider it. 
III THE LANDMARK TAX CASE: FUTURIS
In Futuris35 the company had lodged tax returns showing a taxable income of some $86 million 
flowing from a complex series of intra-group transactions. The ATO subsequently issued two 
separate amended assessments to Futuris, including in each the same amount of $19.95 million in 
relation to a capital gain (in the case of the second amended assessment, the $19.95 million was 
included in a larger sum assessed under Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) 
(ITAA36)). Futuris claimed that the ATO had thereby knowingly ‘double counted’ the $19.95 
million capital gain and that the ATO had therefore issued the second amended assessment in 
bad faith, knowing it to be wrong, which (it argued) constituted an abuse of a public office and 
therefore conscious maladministration. The ATO relied upon the ‘compensating adjustment’ 
provision in s 177F(3) ITAA36 to enable it to exclude the amount of $19.95 million from the 
Part IVA assessment if this was necessary to avoid any ‘double counting’. 
In a joint judgment, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ36 in the High Court rejected 
Futuris’ argument and held that the ATO had not committed misfeasance in public office, 
because its actions did not involve a deliberate failure either to comply with the provisions of 
29 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65, Brennan J [10]
30 Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.
31 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65, joint judgment at [60].
32 NT v Mengel [1995] HCA 65 (Mason CJ, Dawson Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) [62] (though they noted at 
[62] that this was not what was put to the Court in Mengel). This was the interpretation also adopted by the High 
Court subsequently in Sanders v Snell [1998] HCA 64 [38]. 
33 Citing Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 at 347. Similarly, in Roberts v DFCT [2013] FCA 238, Besanko J at first 
instance indicated at [42] merely that he accepted ‘as arguable for the purpose of this application that that form of 
recklessness which bears a close affinity with deliberate conduct … may be sufficient’.
34 See for example the observations by the various Law Lords in Three Rivers (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1.
35 FCT v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] ATC ¶20-039.
36 Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ.
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the Act or to administer a law according to its terms,37 nor was it an act by ATO staff which 
was knowingly in excess of their powers,38 or the exercise of statutory powers corruptly or with 
deliberate disregard for the proper scope of those powers.39
The decision in Futuris highlighted two interesting questions:
1. Are there only two grounds on which the validity of an assessment can be challenged? 
and
2. The role of ‘recklessness’ in relation to conscious maladministration.
A Are There Only Two Bases for Challenging the Validity 
of an Assessment?
The joint judgment in Futuris referred to only two bases for attacking the validity of an 
assessment, namely that the assessment was tentative/provisional, or that there was a conscious 
maladministration of the Act.40
Kirby J disagreed with the other Justices on this point and observed that while tax lawyers 
had typically focussed on these two issues, this did not justify treating these two grounds as the 
only ones relevant to ‘jurisdictional error’ for the purposes of s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903
(Cth). He commented that:
As the two nominated categories of invalidity have arisen in taxation cases for at least 80 
years, there is a risk that specialists in taxation law will overlook, or ignore, the considerable 
subsequent advances in administrative law … Specialist disciplines, including in law, can 
occasionally be myopic and inward-looking … The recognised ‘jurisdictional error’ categories 
in Australia are not closed. Least of all are they confined to the two classifications beloved by 
tax lawyers. According to a leading Australian academic authority on the subject, [8] categories 
have been recognised41 … [which] go well beyond the two that have engaged virtually the 
entire attention of the Federal Court and of this Court in these proceedings and other cases 
like it. There is a risk that the broader categories will be overlooked in such taxation matters 
if reference is made only to past authority and tax appeals. Once disqualifying invalidity 
(‘jurisdictional error’) is propounded, these other categories are necessarily enlivened. When 
a suggestion of invalidation is made, it is not sufficient for the courts, or the parties, simply to 
cite taxation cases.42
Despite His Honour’s strong exhortation, subsequent decisions have tended to favour the 
‘myopic’ interpretation of conscious maladministration. 
Thus in Roberts v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation,43 in the context of an application by 
the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for summary judgment based on Notices of Amended 
Assessments, Besanko J at first instance referred to several passages in the joint judgment in 
Futuris44 in concluding:45
In my opinion there are only two categories of error which are not protected by s 175 of 
the ITAA 1936.46 The other forms of what constitutes jurisdictional error in other areas of 
37 Futuris [55] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
38 Futuris [11] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ).
39 Futuris [59]. 
40 Futuris [51]–[52].
41 In truncated and summary form (see Kirby J at [134], quoting Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional error without the tears’ 
in Groves and Lee (eds) Australian Administrative Law — Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines, 2007 330 
at 335–6), these are: a mistaken denial of jurisdiction; a misapprehension of the limits of the decision-maker’s 
powers; acting outside the general area of the decision-maker’s jurisdiction; acting on a mistaken assumption 
about the existence of an essential requirement; disregarding a required consideration or paying regard to an 
irrelevant one; misconceiving the function being performed or the extent of the decision-maker’s powers; acting 
in bad faith; or breaching natural justice.
42 Futuris [133]–[135] (Kirby J) — see also [136]–[140], [151]–[152].
43 [2013] FCA 238 (Besanko J).
44 See the judgment of Besanko J at [36]–[40]. His Honour stated [41] that his conclusion was consistent with the 
observations of the Full Federal Courts in Marijancevic and Denlay, and with the observations of Kenny J in DCT 
v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (No 2).
45 Roberts v DCT [2013] FCA 1108 [36]–[41] (Besanko J).
46 Roberts v DCT [2013] FCA 1108 [19], point 2, citing Futuris, joint judgment [25].
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administrative law are not sufficient, nor is recklessness in an expanded sense or carelessness 
in the administrative process …47
In the subsequent hearing seeking leave to appeal from Besanko J’s decision,48
Mansfield J seemed to endorse the view that there were only two grounds for challenging an 
assessment.49
Subsequently, in Hii v FCT,50 Collier J referred51 to the decisions in Roberts,52 Marijancevic 
v DFCT,53 Denlay v FCT,54 DCT v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (No 2),55 Commissioner of Taxation 
v AAT56 and Gashi v FCT,57 and stated that these decisions of the Federal Court had ‘narrowed 
the categories where the Court has power to intervene’ in challenges to assessments pursuant to 
s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to the two traditional bases.58
However, there are occasional exceptions. Thus, in Woods v DFC of T,59 a case involving 
an appeal against a summary judgment and refusal to stay enforcement proceedings, Porter J in 
the Supreme Court of Tasmania suggested that a ‘fair reading’ of the joint judgment in Futuris 
did not disclose that their Honours had definitively limited the categories of jurisdictional error 
to only two, and pointed out that it was ‘at least arguable, being the view adopted by Kirby J, 
that there was no intention to limit the categories to these two instances’.60
While the prevailing view appears to be that there are only the two bases for conscious 
maladministration, there is considerable force in the observations by Kirby J in Futuris, and 
it is hard to see any overwhelming rationale in principle for the narrower view — it would 
seem logical to suggest that tax law should take all aspects of administrative law concepts of 
jurisdictional error into account, rather than selecting two and excluding others.
B The Role of Recklessness in Relation to 
Conscious Maladministration
As noted above, the conventional view is that Mengel held that reckless indifference or 
deliberate blindness in relation to the invalidity of or lack of power for a public officer’s acts is 
sufficient to ground an action for conscious maladministration.61
However, it is worth noting that while Deane J and Brennan J were certainly of this view, 
the joint judgment was more guarded, stating merely that ‘there is much to be said for the view 
that misfeasance extends to the situation of a public official recklessly disregarding the means 
of ascertaining the extent of his or her power’.
Similarly, the High Court joint judgment in Futuris observed that the House of Lords had 
indicated that in English law ‘recklessness may be a sufficient state of mind to found the tort’,62
though their comment was expressly directed to English law, and they did not indicate clearly 
47 Roberts v DCT [2013] FCA 1108 [42] (Besanko J).
48 Roberts v DCT [2015] FCA 238 (Mansfield J).
49 Roberts v DCT [2015] FCA 238 [32], [35]–[36], but see [30] (Mansfield J); see also Gashi v FCT [2013] ATC ¶20-
377 [42]–[43].
50 [2015] ATC ¶20-501 (Collier J)
51 [2015] ATC ¶20-501 [81]–[84] (Collier J).
52 Roberts v DCT [2013] FCA 1108 (Besanko J at first instance — referred to by Collier J in Hii v CT [2015] FCA 
375 at [81], and at [82] to the (unsuccessful) application for leave to appeal — Roberts v DCT [2015] FCA 238.
53 Marijancevic v DFC of T [2008] ATC ¶20-046.
54 Denlay v FCT [2011] FCAFC 63; [2011] ATC ¶20-260
55 DCT v Hua Wang Bank Berhad (No 2 (2010) 81 ATR 40 [48].
56 C of T v AAT (2011) 191 FCR 400 [23].
57 Gashi v C of T [2013] FCAFC 30 
58 [2015] ATC ¶20-501 [81].
59 [2011] TASSC 68.
60 [2011] TASSC 68, see [53]–[57].
61 See for example, below, the observations by Logan J in Donoghue at [144]–[145], discussing the decision of the 
House of Lords in Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [No 3] [2003] 2 AC 1; see also Bevacqua, 
above n 8, 49–50. Compare, as to the position in Canada, Du Pont and Lubetsky (above n 1), 116.
62 FCT v Futuris Corporation Ltd [2008] ATC ¶20-039 [11] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), citing 
Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1, 198, 228, 
231.
PROBLEMS IN PARADISE: CONSCIOUS MALADMINISTRATION IN THE ATO
135
whether they believed that the same development had occurred or should occur in Australian 
law.63
Subsequently, in Roberts v DCT, Besanko J in a guarded statement ‘accepted as arguable’ 
for the purposes of the application the proposition that while ‘recklessness in an expanded 
sense or carelessness in the administrative process’ were not sufficient to found an action 
for conscious maladministration, the form of recklessness which ‘bears a close affinity with 
deliberate conduct … may be sufficient’ (emphasis added).64
As noted, on the subsequent hearing seeking leave to appeal that judgment, Mansfield J simply 
endorsed the approach by Besanko J in holding that the facts did not demonstrate conscious 
maladministration, whether or not this included reckless maladministration. Thus His Honour 
left open the issue of whether recklessness could constitute conscious maladministration.
Most recently, in Hii v C of T Collier J noted that the observations by Besanko J on this point 
had been ‘carefully qualified’ and did not support a submission that recklessness (carelessness 
or indifference to the law) constituted bad faith.65
Donoghue seems to have been the first Australian case which raised directly the 
issue of whether reckless indifference was a sufficient ground for an action in conscious 
maladministration. At first instance (the case is on appeal to the Full Federal Court) Logan 
J quoted with apparent approval the statements by the various Lords in the UK case of Three 
Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3),66 where their Lordships stated variously 
that:
[it is] settled law that an act performed in reckless indifference as to the outcome is sufficient 
to ground the tort … (Lord Steyn at 192); 
[it is sufficient that] the public officer … is reckless as to [as to the probability that their action 
will injure another person] (Lord Hutton at 228); and 
[it is sufficient if the] official does the act intentionally being aware that it risks directly causing 
loss … and the official wilfully disregards that risk (Lord Hobhouse at 231).
Logan J noted that each of their Lordships expressly adopted as correct the proposition 
which they drew from Mengel that ‘proof of recklessness was sufficient in relation to the tort of 
misfeasance in public office’;67 Logan J also observed that recklessness was regarded in Futuris 
as ‘sufficient to establish the element of consciousness in conscious maladministration’.68
While including recklessness seems the better approach in policy terms,69 it is not clear 
that the joint judgment in Mengel (as distinct from Deane J and Brennan J) actually held that 
reckless indifference was a sufficient ground. 
It will be interesting to see the approach taken by the Full Federal Court on this issue when 
it hears the appeal in Donoghue.
63 Collier J cited the joint judgment in Futuris at [11] as support for his interpretation. However, as noted, their 
Honours in Futuris had not clearly endorsed this result, instead stating obliquely that ‘The House of Lords has 
since indicated that in English law recklessness may be a sufficient state of mind to found the tort. The affinity 
between tort law and public law has been remarked upon in this Court … [reflecting] the precept that in a legal 
system such as that maintained by the Constitution executive or administrative power is not to be exercised for 
ulterior or improper purposes’.
64 Roberts v DCT [2013] FCA 1108 [42] — Besanko J had stated earlier in his judgment that ‘Recklessness is very 
close to conscious maladministration in that it is proceeding with a course of conduct well knowing that it is likely 
that it is not in accordance with the law and prescribed administrative processes, but careless or indifferent to that 
fact. It includes a serious departure from the law in prescribed administrative processes to the point that one can 
infer what blindness or a state of mind akin to that.…’ [28]. His Honour at [30]–[33] discounted comments made 
by French J in DCT v Warrick (No 2) [2004] FCA 918 [100] on the point as being of doubtful weight, given that 
the observations in that case were qualified and made before the decision in Futuris.
65 [2015] FCA 375 [99] (Collier J).
66 [2003] 2 AC 1, 193 (Lord Steyn), 228 (Lord Hutton) and 231 (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough).
67 [2015] ATC ¶20-494 [144] (Logan J).
68 [2015] ATC ¶20-494 [145] (Logan J) — but see the discussion in the text near n 57 above.
69 Bevacqua, above n 8, 50, comments that including recklessness as a sufficient element of the tort ‘gives rise to 
the only practical hope of the tort being available in all but the rarest cases of ATO operational mistake causing 
taxpayer loss’.
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IV PROBLEMS IN PARADISE: DONOGHUE V COMMISSIONER 
OF TAXATION 70
It seems that Donoghue is the only Australian case (to date) where a taxpayer has succeeded in 
proving conscious maladministration by the ATO.71
The facts of Donoghue are startling, to say the least. 
In that case, Mr Donoghue had retained a firm of solicitors (Moore & Associates) to act 
for him in relation to a range of matters. A large part of the relevant work was done by Simeon 
Moore, the son of Peter Moore, a partner in that legal firm. Simeon was at the time a student in 
the Law School of an Australian university, but was not then admitted to practice. 
The judge found that Simeon performed most of the work for Donoghue in relation to 
various litigious matters, working as a ‘lay associate’ or ‘consultant’ on behalf of Moore & 
Associates.72 In the course of that work, Simeon created a considerable amount of legal advice, 
documentation and other materials prepared in relation to anticipated litigation, which the judge 
held was protected by legal professional privilege. 
Simeon subsequently rendered a bill to Mr Donoghue for some $750,000 for work allegedly 
done. Logan J found that: 
The number of hours stated on this invoice to have been worked … over the period mentioned 
is truly fantastic both in total and with reference to individual days. If the entries on the invoice 
are to be believed, for the period between 20 April and 5 June 2010 (each inclusive) and 
between 13 and 15 June 2010 (each inclusive), Simeon Moore performed services each and 
every hour of each and every day that fell in these periods. Again if the entries on the invoice 
are to be believed, the latter period was worked after working 17 hours on 10 June, 18 hours 
11 June and 22 hours on 12 June. In total, including GST and what was said to be ‘ancillary 
costs’, the total amount said to be owing is $753,174.62. And this for the services of an as yet 
not admitted law graduate undertaking post-graduate studies in law …
The sum sought is outrageously extortionate ... I regard this tax invoice as a fantasy document 
…73
Perhaps not surprisingly, Donoghue refused to pay the bill. Following this refusal, Simeon 
had a conversation with Donoghue to the effect that if the bill was not paid, Simeon would 
‘have no hesitation giving the ATO everything I have on you. You should be very worried. A 
family friend is an Assistant Commissioner and I’ve reported people to him before and he has 
taken them down …’74
In October 2010, the ATO had already commenced an audit into Donoghue as a result of 
information apparently received from unrelated third-party sources and by the end of October 
2011, the auditor in charge of the case (Main) had prepared a draft report — prior to receiving 
any information from Simeon. Main was a junior auditor and this was the first ATO audit for 
which he had primary responsibility.
Subsequently, in November 2011, Simeon provided considerable information and 
documentation about Donohue’s affairs by email at various times to Mr Wabeck of the ATO, 
including material protected by legal professional privilege. This was done without Donoghue’s 
consent.
70 [2015] ATC ¶20-494 (Logan J); s Grieve and K Bertram ‘The Commissioner of Taxation’s duty of administration 
of the tax laws under the microscope’ <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bd0e75c0-2cfa-40a7-
bb85-807f76de052f&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML> (June 30, 2015).
71 In Donoghue [130], the Commissioner of Taxation was held to be the ‘public officer’ because ultimately he was 
responsible under the Act for the issue of the tax assessments in question. This neatly side-stepped the problem 
identified by Bevacqua at 44–5 that junior public servants such as Mr Main (the auditor in question) might not be 
held to be ‘public officers’. This in turn raises the issue of a potential order for damages being made against the 
Commissioner personally (see above).
72 The judge found that Simeon had initially provided a small amount of preliminary ‘research’ advice on an 
independent basis.
73 Donoghue v C of T [2015] FCA 235 [71]–[72] (Logan J).
74 [2015] FCA 235 [73] (Logan J).
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The material supplied by Simeon to the ATO was passed on to another ATO officer (Clark) 
who in turn passed it on to Main. The information provided significant new insights and 
information, and as a result, Main abandoned his original report and prepared a new one using 
the information provided by Simeon. This new report was used as the basis for preparation 
of default assessments later served on Donoghue, together with imposition of penalties and 
a Departure Prohibition Order (‘DPO’). The whole process had been conducted in secret 
within the ATO, to avoid Donoghue learning of its plans — the ATO apparently feared that 
if Donoghue became aware of the proposed assessments and DPO, he might move overseas 
to avoid payment of tax owing. Main was therefore reluctant to ask either Peter Moore or 
Donoghue about the documents obtained, in case this alerted Donoghue to the ATO’s interest 
in his affairs. Similarly, neither Wabeck nor Clark sought to explore with Simeon or anyone 
else whether any of the materials might be privileged,75 even though Main had alerted them to 
his apprehension about the possibility of legal professional privilege applying to at least some 
of the documents.
Main knew that he should not use for assessment purposes any material covered by legal 
professional privilege. He gave evidence that when he first received the information, he 
considered whether the documents received were likely to be covered by the privilege, and 
concluded that this was ‘unlikely’ because it was not apparent on the face of the documents that 
they recorded the provision of legal advice to Donoghue.76 Logan J noted that this conclusion 
was a ‘convenient one’ for Main, as he was at the time under ‘a degree of time pressure to 
complete the audit’,77 and observed that Main’s ‘conclusion as to what was necessary to make 
these extracted documents privileged was mistaken and reckless’.78
Upon receiving the default assessments, Donoghue rightly surmised, in light of the threat 
made by Simeon, that some of his privileged communications may have been given to the ATO 
and accordingly retained new solicitors to challenge under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
the validity of the assessments, alleging among other things ‘conscious maladministration’ by 
the Commissioner79 through the ATO staff’s improper use of the privileged materials.
Logan J upheld Donoghue’s argument, finding so far as relevant that:
1. While Main did not deliberately use material knowing it definitely to be privileged, he 
did ‘deliberately not pursue or cause to be pursued inquiries which would have quelled an 
apprehension, always present, which he had that the documents and information provided 
by Simeon Moore (or some indeterminable part thereof) were subject to legal professional 
privilege’.80
2. Main knew that he could not use privileged material in the audit, that the privilege could 
not be waived by third parties or a solicitor, and that in any case there was no evidence of 
waiver in the materials.81
3. Main was always apprehensive that some of the material might be privileged, but ‘chose 
to take his own counsel’ on this issue, ‘closed his eyes to the obvious’ and (wrongly) 
concluded that the risk of the documents being protected by privilege was low:
Mr Main deliberately chose not to make or cause to be made inquiries [about the possible 
application of the privilege]. He chose to take a risk … that the material might indeed be 
privileged and its use in the process of assessment forbidden by law. He made these choices 
under the pressure of a limited time within which to complete his audit … [and] acted in 
reckless disregard of a right which Mr Donoghue had at least to claim an important common 
law privilege.82
75 Donoghue [107] (Logan J).
76 Donoghue [100] (Logan J).
77 Donoghue [101] (Logan J).
78 Donoghue [102] (Logan J).
79 Donoghue [123]–[131] (Logan J).
80 Donoghue [112] (Logan J).
81 Donoghue [112] (Logan J).
82 Donoghue [107] [112], [113] (Logan J).
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[Moreover, Main] … ‘chose, deliberately, not to put in place a regime which would protect 
any claimed privilege before use was made of that material for assessing purposes’.83
Accordingly, Logan J held that the Commissioner of Taxation84 had, through Main’s 
actions, committed conscious maladministration in the assessment process. The assessments 
were therefore quashed, as were the penalties and DPO.85 The materials provided by Simeon 
were to be either returned to Donoghue or destroyed.
Logan J did not directly address the issue of whether personal liability could attach to the 
Commissioner (or Main), though presumably the Crown or another body would normally 
indemnify those found to be liable.86
V INADEQUATE SUPERVISION CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROBLEM
In Donoghue, Logan J noted that Mr Main struck him as 
an intelligent, serious-minded young man, dedicated to his auditing duties within the Australian 
Taxation Office … This was the first audit for which he had primary responsibility… I do not 
consider that the weakness in the process of assessment revealed by this case was one of 
character on Mr Main’s part but rather … of inexperience and zeal, coupled with a lack of 
relevant supervision and guidance.87
Logan J went on to observe that Main would have benefited from advice and guidance from 
‘an engaged, experienced supervisor’ and perhaps also external legal advice to advise him on 
the implications of the proposed use of the questionable material supplied by Simeon Moore in 
preparing assessments.88
On the latter point, Logan J observed that Main’s supervisors and colleagues within the ATO 
had also fallen short of the ideal.89 Main had advised the colleagues who had given the Simeon 
materials to him of his apprehension that at least some of the materials might be covered by 
legal professional privilege, but despite this, neither colleague tried to persuade him not to 
use the material, nor did they alert Main’s supervisors to his concerns or explore with Simeon 
Moore or anyone else the question of whether any of the material Simeon was offering to the 
Australian Taxation Office might be privileged (even though they were the ones who were 
initially in direct contact with Simeon).90
Similarly, although Main did not actually alert his supervisors or others to his concerns 
about the possibility of legal professional privilege applying, Logan J was critical of the fact 
that neither of Main’s supervisors within the ATO detected his apprehension in relation to this 
issue, or offered him any guidance as to the possible implications of using the material provided 
by Simeon Moore to create assessments. His Honour observed that
The defect in the process of assessment revealed by this case is not one for which Mr Main 
is solely responsible. It is to be remembered that while rank has its privileges, it also has its 
responsibilities.91
This is a clear warning to the ATO of the need for systemic reform in these areas if it is to 
avoid a recurrence of such problems.
83 Donoghue [138] (Logan J).
84 Logan J observed at [130] that the Commissioner had rightly been joined as respondent to the action because under 
the deeming provision in s 8(2) of the Taxation Administration Act, the assessments and notices issued by delegates 
of the Commissioner were deemed to have been given by the Commissioner of Taxation. 
85 Donoghue [145]–[148]. Collier J at [145] noted that it was — in the first instance — for the Commissioner 
to decide whether, having regard to the information still available to the ATO and ‘in the circumstances now 
prevailing’ whether the issue of fresh assessments ‘is possible in fact and in law’.
86 Bevacqua above n 8, 43; Robert Evans, ‘Damages for Unlawful Administrative Action: The Remedy for 
Misfeasance in Public Office’ (1982) 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 640, 644–5, Traditionally, 
Crown vicarious liability has not applied to conscious maladministration: Bevacqua, above n 8, 43.
87 Donoghue [99], (Logan J).
88 Donoghue [99] (Logan J).
89 Donoghue [99] (Logan J).
90 Donoghue [107], [114] (Logan J).
91 Donoghue [107] (Logan J).
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VI ATO ‘OBFUSCATION’ AND DOOMED ARGUMENTS
Logan J was also critical of the ATO’s response when Donoghue’s new lawyers queried whether 
the ATO had received privileged material and sought to claim privilege in relation to it on 
behalf of Donoghue. 
Logan J observed that the ATO’s initial response of requiring Donoghue to provide details of 
the specific documents they claimed were subject to privilege ‘might accurately be described as 
obfuscation by the Australian Taxation Office’, since this was an impossible task for Donoghue 
and his lawyers, who did not know which documents had been given to the ATO!92
This would seem an inappropriate response from a federal government department, and 
certainly not one expected of a ‘model litigant’.93
Logan J also gave short shrift to doomed arguments by the ATO that it did not matter 
whether the material was privileged and Main had been wilfully blind ‘or worse’, because a 
different ATO officer had actually made the assessment decision.94
Logan J also quickly dismissed an argument that s 263 ITAA 36 impliedly overrode the 
privilege, holding that authority had established that the section was too general to overthrow a 
fundamental principle such as legal professional privilege.95
His Honour also dismissed an argument that the decision in Denlay (above) justified the 
ATO actions (in Denlay, the ATO had been given stolen bank records and used them to assess 
taxpayers, but had not been a party to the theft of those records). The Full Federal Court there 
had said that in those circumstances, the Commissioner was not obliged to refrain from carrying 
out his statutory duty to assess the taxpayer merely because the Commissioner held even a 
reasonable suspicion that his officers may have committed some illegality in the course of 
gathering information. Logan J commented that: 
The passage … from Denlay is not … an endorsement of the proposition that s 166 gives 
the Commissioner carte blanche consciously to maladminister the ITAA36 in the process of 
making an assessment.
It is perhaps surprising that the ATO ran these arguments, given their tenuous nature and, 
particularly, the weight of authority developed over an extended period that legal professional 
privilege applies to constrain s 263.96
VII THE IMPLICATIONS OF DONOGHUE
It is important to recognise that the case does not indicate that the ATO is in some way malevolent 
— in a large bureaucracy, operating in such a sensitive field, some mishaps are almost bound 
to occur. The key is to learn from them and avoid repetitions. 
In that light, the following points (among others) can be drawn from Donoghue:
1. The decision in Donoghue clearly holds that reckless indifference is a sufficient basis for 
a finding of conscious maladministration. That is, it is not necessary that an ATO officer 
‘deliberately use material which he knew definitely to be privileged’ (emphasis added); it 
is sufficient if they act with reckless indifference in that they ‘deliberately [did] not pursue 
or cause to be pursued inquiries which would have quelled an apprehension … that the 
documents and information … (or some indeterminable part thereof) were subject to legal 
professional privilege’.97
92 Donoghue [115] (Logan J).
93 Donoghue [132]–[140]. This is not the first time that the ATO has been criticised for inappropriate conduct: see 
Woellner et al, Australian Taxation Law (25th edn) CCH Australia ¶31-505. 
94 Donoghue [117]–[132], [136]–[137]. Logan J also noted at [133]–[134] that while he understood that the 
Commissioner had been ‘disposed at one stage to submit’ that the words ‘any other information in his possession’ 
in s 166 authorised the ATO to use for assessment purposes information covered by legal professional privilege 
‘no such submission was pressed’ and that to have pressed the point ‘would have run counter to over-whelming 
authority’. 
95 Donoghue [136]–[139] (Logan J).
96 See for example FC of T & Ors v Citibank Ltd 89 ATC 4268, 4274–7 (Bowen CJ and Fisher J; Allen Allen and 
Hemsley v DFC of T 89 ATC 4294; FC of T v Coombes (No 2) 99 ATC 4634, [32]–[34] (Sundberg, Merkel and 
Kenny JJ); JMA Accounting Pty Ltd & Entrepreneur Services Pty Ltd v Carmody [2004] ATC 4916, 4919–20 
(Spender, Madgwick and Finkelstein JJ). 
97 Donoghue (above) [112] (Logan J). 
JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALASIAN LAW TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
140
  It will be interesting to see what approach the Full Federal Court takes to the issue — 
and in light of the High Court’s comments in Mengel and Sanders — perhaps even more 
interesting to see the High Court’s approach, should the matter proceed that far.
2. The prevailing view is that there are only two bases on which the validity of an assessment 
can be challenged under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903: a provisional/tentative assessment 
or conscious maladministration.
3. The case underlines the need for systemic improvements in education of ATO staff on key 
issues relevant to their work, particularly junior staff in the early stages of their career. It 
also points to the need to monitor case-work closely to ensure that unrealistic or looming 
deadlines do not cause procedural aberrations.
4. There is a clear need for systemic improvements within the ATO in supervision processes 
and the training and education of potential supervisors. 
5. Logan J’s criticism of the ATO’s apparent ‘obfuscation’ in response to the attempt by 
Donoghue’s lawyers to claim privilege signals a potentially serious issue that needs to be 
addressed urgently by the ATO.98
6. It was surprising to see the ATO argue that s 263 overrode legal professional privilege, 
given the weight of authority to the contrary and the ATO’s acknowledgment over many 
years that the privilege does apply to constrain ATO access powers.
7. The fact that the Commissioner was impliedly held to be the public officer is interesting. 
The decision on this point rested largely on the basis that under the relevant income tax 
legislation, the Commissioner bears the statutory responsibility to issue assessments, albeit 
through statutory delegations and authorisations. It is possible that the absence of such 
direct statutory responsibilities may produce a different result in a future case.99
8. The case raises the interesting question of whether the Commissioner — as the relevant 
public officer — could be held personally liable for any damages caused to Donoghue by 
the actions of ATO staff, for whom the Commissioner is ultimately responsible.
VIII OVERSEAS EXPERIENCES
As noted above, Australia is not alone in finding cause for concern with the actions of government 
departments. The Canadian tax system is often compared to that of Australia, and again in this 
context, a comparison is useful and enlightening. There have been similar concerns raised 
in Canada in recent times,100 and while the circumstances and context may be different, the 
underlying issues are analogous.101
For example, it has been reported102 that in Canada:
• the court in McCreight held that the Canadian Revenue Authority (‘CRA’) officer 
investigating use of R&D tax credits based on advice given by tax advisers in a large 
accounting firm had sworn an information alleging fraud and conspiracy against certain 
parties primarily in order to enable the investigator to retain possession of the seized 
 98 See for example R Woellner, ‘Is the ATO a law unto itself?’, paper presented at ALTA 2007 (Perth).
 99 See s 8 ITAA 1936, and related provisions which confer a general power of administration on the Commissioner 
in relation to a wide range of direct and indirect tax Acts.
100 And similar difficulties encountered in taxpayers obtaining relief — indeed, Du Pont and Lubetsky go so far as to 
assert that in Canada, the result of jurisdictional gaps has been that ‘CRA auditors largely have licence to act with 
near impunity’ — above n 1, 105, 108.
101 Compare for example J Bevacqua, ‘Suing Canadian Tax Officials for Negligence: An Assessment of Recent 
Developments’, (2013) 61(4) Canadian Tax Journal 893; M J Hewitt, ‘Can You Sue the Canada Revenue Agency 
for Investigating You?’ <http://www.singleton.com/en/Publications/Can_You_Sue _the_Canada_Revenue_
Agency_for_Investigating_You.aspx>.
102 By way of background, see D Jacyk, ‘The Dividing Line Between the Jurisdictions of the Tax Court of Canada and 
Other Superior Courts’ (2008) 56(3) Canadian Tax Journal 661, 692–6, 704–7; Du Pont and Lubetsky, above n 1, 
103; Collins Barlow, ‘Oh! Taxman, what big teeth you have’ <http://www.collinsbarrow.com/en/cbn/publications/
oh-taxman-what-big-teeth-you-have>. See also D Rotfleisch, ‘Rulings on CRA general duty of care — a positive 
development’ Law Times, Speakers Corner, 26 January 2015; G Purse, ‘How To Sue The CRA’ <http://www.
mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=402130&email_access=on>; Hewitt, above n 101; and cf Bevacqua above n 
101, 893.
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documents. As a result, the advisers lodged claims for misfeasance in public office, 
negligence and abuse of process;103
• in Archambault, Justice Reimnitz at first instance found that Revenu Québec had acted 
in bad faith by intentionally and maliciously withholding the taxpayer’s R&D tax credits 
to put financial pressure on them, seizing their bank account improperly and keeping 
the taxpayer uninformed about proceedings, thus making it difficult for them to prepare 
a defence;104
• in Chhabra v The Queen, the state was ordered to pay exemplary damages for their 
agents’ use of tainted documents and action in maliciously garnisheeing 75% of the 
taxpayer’s gross professional income;105
• in Longley v MNR: punitive damages were awarded where the CRA improperly 
refused to recognise the taxpayer’s arrangement and intentionally misled the taxpayer 
by falsely denying that it had legal advice supporting the legality of the taxpayer’s 
arrangement;106
• in Joncas v Agence du Revenu Quebec107 damages were awarded where RQ asserted 
premises the auditor knew were false, and ignored the obvious in issuing assessments; 
and 
• in Groupe Enico Inc v Agence du Revenu du Quebec108 compensation of some $4 
million plus interest was awarded where CRA created falsely inflated assessments, 
planted evidence and took a range of other inappropriate actions. 
Such cases (and Donoghue in Australia) underline the point made at the outset — large 
bureaucracies, no matter how committed institutionally to public service, must be assiduous in 
training and monitoring staff to ensure that the organisational ideals are upheld and applied in 
practice despite human frailties and organisational pressures.
IX CONCLUSION
The tort of conscious maladministration represents an important check on conscious abuse of 
public office.
The tort has existed for many years, but was largely ignored by the tax profession in 
Australia109 until 2008, when it was highlighted by the High Court decision in Futuris. Since 
then, the tort has become almost a staple pleading in cases challenging ATO assessments, 
though until the 2015 decision in Donoghue, no taxpayer had succeeded in such claims.
Understandably, the courts have been concerned to keep the tort within reasonable bounds, 
requiring that claimants prove that the decision-maker had been actuated by ‘malice’ as defined 
in various court decisions.
However, the facts in Donoghue — allied to the examples of abuse overseas — demonstrate 
that the courts must balance this constraint with the need to ensure that people who suffer 
damage as a result of conscious maladministration by government departments are not denied 
a remedy on technical grounds.
The decision in Donoghue also underlines the need for the ATO (and other government 
departments) to ensure that staff — particularly those in key areas — are well trained and 
supervised, and do not allow excess zeal (or other failings) to create the sort of problems that 
arose in that case.
A key point to emerge from Donoghue is the express endorsement by Logan J of recklessness 
as a foundation for the action in conscious maladministration. If the point is upheld by the Full 
Federal Court on appeal, this would make it (somewhat) easier for future claimants to succeed 
in actions against the ATO (and other government departments/officials). 
103 McCreight v AG 2012 ONSC 1983; Purse above n 102, 3.
104 Archambault v Revenu Quebec 2013 QCCS 5189 [699]; Purse above, 5.
105 89 DTC 5310 (FCTD).
106 (1992) 66 B.C.L.R (2d) 238 (CA).
107 2012 QCCQ 5096.
108 2013 QCCS 5189.
109 Though taxpayers had made numerous claims for ‘bad faith’ in various ATO decisions, as noted.
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The decision of the Full Federal Court on this and other issues will therefore have a 
significant impact on the future development of this area of the law, and will be watched with 
close interest by the ATO and tax advisers alike. 
